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Using Taxes to Improve Cap and Trade, Part I: Distribution
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Introduction
A large part of the global warming debate has focused on
choosing the best policy instrument to combat the trend. If
given one instrument to choose, most economists would
reach for a carbon tax. However, carbon taxes are not terribly
popular with voters or politicians.1 Australia, one of the few
countries to have imposed a carbon tax, abolished it in July.2
On the bright side, we live in a world of multiple policy
instruments, and those instruments can interact with each
other in ways that can produce superior results as compared
with what any one of those instruments might produce in
isolation. This article is the first in a series in which we will
explore how state-level cap-and-trade regimes can be im-
proved by incorporating tax elements.3
Our central purpose in these articles is to critique aspects
of California’s cap-and-trade regime (AB 32) and to suggest
how this regime should be reformed in light of our cri-
tiques.4 We also intend for these articles to be instructive as
to important issues involved in the design of cap-and-trade
regimes outside California — especially in other U.S. states.
Throughout this series, we primarily want to make three
pragmatic, and perhaps surprising, points about the state of
market-based mechanisms to control greenhouse gas emis-
sions. All of these points relate to how tax-system-like ele-
ments can be introduced into a cap-and-trade regime. Our
first point — the focus of this article — is to explain how
those tax elements can improve a cap-and-trade regime by
making the regime fairer to the disadvantaged. Second, we
will explain how tax elements can mitigate a cap-and-trade
regime’s impact on economic growth and thereby make the
regime more efficient for everyone. Our third point will be
to explain how states might incorporate border adjustments
into a cap-and-trade regime (another tax element, but one
found more commonly in the context of value added taxes).
This third point is important because without border ad-
justments a state that imposed a robust price on carbon
would find itself at a competitive disadvantage.
In this article, we will focus on the distributional issues
involved in implementing cap-and-trade regimes. Specifi-
cally, we will argue that the structure of California’s AB 32
will unnecessarily disadvantage lower-income Californians
under the announced plan to give away approximately half
of the permits to businesses and pollution-emitting entities.
The Basics on Instrument Choice
Air pollution is perhaps the classic negative externality.5
For instance, imagine that one manufacturer reaps all the
1Barry G. Rabe and Christopher P. Borick, ‘‘Carbon Taxation and
Policy Labeling: Experience From American States and Canadian
Provinces,’’ 29 Rev. of Pol’y Res. 358 (2012).
2Michelle Innis, ‘‘Australia Scraps Tax on Carbon,’’ The New York
Times, July 17, 2014. Not all jurisdictions have been unable to sustain
a carbon tax; British Columbia has had one since 2008. David G. Duff,
‘‘Carbon Taxation in British Columbia,’’ 10 Vt. J. of Int’l L. 87 (2008).
Carbon taxes might not even be as politically toxic as commonly
believed, at least in California. Mark Baldassare, ‘‘Californians and the
Carbon Tax,’’ The Public Policy Institute of California blog (last
updated July 31, 2014).
3For two more detailed discussions, see Arik Levinson, ‘‘Belts and
Suspenders: Interactions Among Climate Policy Regulations’’ Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., working paper No. 16109 (2010); and Cameron
Hepburn, ‘‘Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of
Instrument Choice,’’ 22 Oxford Rev. of Econ. Pol’y 226 (2006).
4This series of articles grows out of policy advisory work regarding
AB 32.
5This discussion follows the standard presentation in public fi-
nance textbooks. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public
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profits from producing a good but is forced to cope with
only a small fraction of the costs it is imposing on all of us —
say, medical costs — because of reduced air quality. The
classic solution is to force the polluter to internalize those
costs, and the classic instrument is a corrective tax. If each
unit of production causes $X of harm, the tax must be $X so
that the producer gets the right price signal and produces the
socially optimal amount of pollution. Note that if we knew
what the socially optimal level was, we could also achieve the
same thing by regulating the quantity of pollution.
That last point indicates an important subtlety. If we are
unsure about the optimal quantity of greenhouse gases we
want to permit given the economic cost of restricting their
emissions, which is better — tax or regulation? It turns out
that it depends on our best guess as to the cost of guessing
wrong. If we absolutely do not want to be wrong, then a
regulation is preferable; that is presumably how most people
think about nuclear accidents. We have regulations that
essentially try to set the accident level at close to zero. Most
economists think the damage done by greenhouse gases does
not increase as dramatically compared with a nuclear acci-
dent. Thus, there is a danger that we might pay for more
mitigation than would be optimal. In that kind of situation,
the better choice is typically thought to be a tax. We know
roughly how much money the tax will raise; we can then see
how much reduction is achieved for that cost and adjust
later as appropriate.
Taxing and command-and-control regulation are not the
only two options for mitigating externalities, especially in a
more complicated scenario more closely approximating the
real world. There is also cap and trade. In terms of political
economy, that is a very fortunate development given that
taxes are arguably the better tool but are more politically
fraught.
To understand how cap and trade can mimic a tax,
suppose there are two factories, one that can reduce pollu-
tion cheaply and one that can only do so expensively. We
want the factory that can reduce emissions cheaply to do so
first. If we impose a straight tax per ton of pollution, the
factory that can reduce emissions cheaply will have a greater
reduction in its carbon emissions — up until the point when
the cost of reducing one more ton would equal the cost of
the tax per ton. The dirtier factory might make a few cheap
improvements but would generally do better just paying the
tax. A cap-and-trade system can achieve the same result as a
carbon tax.The less polluting factory will have an easier time
staying under the cap and would then sell its leftover allow-
ances to the dirtier plant.
One complexity created by a cap-and-trade regime versus
a tax is that the legislature or a regulator must decide how
many allowances there should be and which businesses
should receive them and in what quantities. There is also the
more fundamental question of whether the allowances will
be given away to emitters, sold, or a mixture of both.
AB 32 in California is a cap-and-trade solution to the
negative externality caused by greenhouse gases.6 It places
caps on the emission of global warming gases within Cali-
fornia. AB 32 came into effect in 2013 for the electricity and
large-industry sectors. In 2015, AB 32 will be expanded to
transportation fuels. AB 32 requires that applicable entities
purchase or otherwise obtain allowances for each ton of
global warming gases emitted. The California Air Resources
Board (CARB) is scheduled to gradually reduce the total
number of available allowances beginning in 2015, such
that the impact of AB 32 on California’s economy should
increase annually beginning in 2015.
If AB 32 is successful in reducing
California’s greenhouse gas emissions,
California consumers will necessarily
face higher prices for gasoline,
electricity, industrial products, and a
host of other goods and services that
involve greenhouse gas emissions.
AB 32 has been subject to a great deal of litigation.
Significantly, the state recently won a decision upholding
AB 32’s low carbon fuel standard against the charge that the
standard discriminated against interstate commerce.7 We
plan to discuss this case further in a later article.
If AB 32 is successful in reducing California’s greenhouse
gas emissions, California consumers will necessarily face
higher prices for gasoline, electricity, industrial products,
and a host of other goods and services that involve green-
house gas emissions. That is the price being set by the
cap-and-trade regime on the negative externality. Some
portion of that economic cost of AB 32 will be borne by
workers and by the owners of businesses and capital. Nev-
ertheless, because lower-income Californians tend to spend
Policy 137-47 (2013). For further detail, see Hepburn, supra note 3.
For the seminal analysis, see Martin Weitzman, ‘‘Prices v. Quantities,’’
41 Rev. of Econ Stud. 477 (1974). For some of our prior work on related
topics, see, e.g., Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Three Articles on Tax Salience:
Market Salience and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax Law Review 19, 65-74
(2011); Gamage, ‘‘Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective
Taxes in Campaign Finance,’’ 113 Yale L.J. 1283 (2004).
6Cal. Health & Safety Code section 38500.
7It was a narrow victory in a sense. California lost in the federal
district court, won before a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, and
won before the full Ninth Circuit in that the full court refused to hear
the case but seven judges dissented from the refusal. The Supreme
Court has now refused to grant certiorari. Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL
1118399. AB 32 has been subject to other litigation, see Steven Ferrey,
‘‘The Carbon Suite in the Hotel California: ‘We Are All Just Prisoners
Here, of Our Own Device,’’’ 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 451 (2014).
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a larger portion of their incomes on goods that involve
greenhouse gas emissions, most analyses suggest that the
economic impact of AB 32 will disproportionately fall on
lower-income Californians, unless allowances are sold and
the revenue is used to benefit this group. In other words, to
the extent that allowances are given away to emitters, rather
than sold, the economic impact of AB 32 is likely to be
regressive.
Revenue Potential and Distributional Effects
In theory, both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems
can raise revenue that can be used for a variety of purposes.
Carbon taxes raise revenue through the straightforward
mechanism of requiring emitters to pay the tax. Cap-and-
trade systems can similarly raise revenue to the extent that
allowances are sold to emitters, rather than given away.
Depending on what percentage of allowances are sold and
on the price charged per allowance, a cap-and-trade system
has the potential to generate the same revenue as a carbon
tax. However, CARB plans to give away about half of all
available allowances through 2020.8
Both cap-and-trade regimes and carbon taxes increase
consumer prices in a manner likely to be regressive.9 That is,
poorer people are likely to spend a higher portion of their
income on those items made more expensive by the impo-
sition of a cap and trade — for example, energy to heat one’s
home. With a carbon tax, this issue can be readily mitigated,
perhaps reversed, through dedicating the revenue raised by
the tax to programs that aid the poor, such as tax credits. The
revenue generated by selling allowances under a cap-and-
trade regime can be similarly used.
Selling allowances to emitters, rather than giving them
away, might result in larger increases to consumer prices
because emitters would spend more acquiring the allow-
ances. Yet simply giving allowances away is a crude approach
for mitigating the impact of AB 32. For instance, CARB is
giving away allowances to California utilities to mitigate any
sudden rate increases.10 Yet those allowances protect rich
Californians as well as poorer Californians, and only limited
protection is thus provided to those who need it the most.
To be sure, unexpected rate increases possibly cause an
independent harm, but, as a general matter, that is clearly
not the most effective way to aid poorer taxpayers.
A similar example is that most states exempt many food
purchases from their sales taxes so as to mitigate their
regressiveness. Clearly the food sales tax exemption miti-
gates the tax’s regressiveness, but that is a clumsy and
expensive way to pursue that policy given that wealthier
people tend to consume more expensive foods than lower-
income people. It is not as if we do not have an instrument
that measures taxpayer ability to pay, at least roughly. That
instrument is called the income tax, and the information it
collects should be leveraged to maximize the distributive
benefit of any revenue resulting from cap and trade or a
carbon tax.
Of course, there are many options for how the revenue
from selling allowances might be used. But it is important to
understand that all of those options involve trade-offs
among minimizing the distributional harm to lower-
income Californians, minimizing the harmful impact on
economic growth, and furthering other policy goals.11
The distributional harm to
lower-income Californians from cap and
trade could be minimized by using
revenue raised to provide targeted
payments, such as tax credits or refunds.
The distributional harm to lower-income Californians
from cap and trade could be minimized by using revenue
raised to provide targeted payments — such as tax credits or
refunds — to lower-income California taxpayers or to fund
spending for the benefit of lower-income Californians. In
contrast, the harm to economic growth from AB 32 could
be minimized by using the revenue to reduce the rates of
existing taxes or to fund spending programs that could
benefit California’s overall economy. Combining the two
policy goals might suggest that revenue should be used to
reduce the rates of existing regressive taxes — such as the
sales tax. Another possible combination could be to fund
projects that help the state economy generally but lower-
income residents particularly. Public transportation, which
also aids AB 32’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
is a plausible candidate.
Importantly, using revenue to promote other policy goals
— for instance, combating fiscal volatility — at least par-
tially comes at the expense of reducing the distributional
8Legislative Analyst’s Office, ‘‘2014-15 Budget: Cap-and-Trade
Auction Revenue Expenditure Plan (2014),’’ at 3.
9See generally Daniel A. Farber, ‘‘Pollution Markets and Social
Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade,’’ 39 Ecology L.Q. 1,
48-53 (2012).
10CARB, Allocation Allowance (last updated Aug. 1, 2014).
11There is an additional limitation governing how allowance rev-
enue might be used in California, with its limitations on the ability of
the State Legislature to increase taxes. A California superior court has
upheld the selling of allowances by holding that they do not constitute
a tax for purposes of Art. XIII, section 3, of the California Constitu-
tion. The judge called the question ‘‘close,’’ and that decision is now
being appealed. California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air
Resources Board, No. 34-2012-80001313 at *16 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013).
If California were to treat the revenue as ordinary general fund revenue,
which it has not done, that likely would affect whether the allowances
are considered taxes. It is possible that several of the expedients we
discuss are therefore not practical options for California, which is
unfortunate. For further analysis of this legal risk, see Deborah Lambe
and Daniel Farber, ‘‘California’s Cap-and-Trade Auction Proceeds:
Taxes, Fees, or Something Else?’’ Berkeley Law Center for Law, Energy
& the Environment (2012).
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impact on lower-income taxpayers. The most volatile of
California’s tax bases are also the most progressive tax
bases.12 Certainly, it is possible to further multiple goals by
using portions of the revenue for different purposes. For
instance, using the majority of revenue to fund refunds to
lower-income taxpayers, while reserving a portion for a
rainy day fund, could advance both distributional and fiscal
volatility goals. Ultimately, however, there is only one rev-
enue pie that can be divided, and there are trade-offs among
the various purposes for which revenue might be used.
A substantial portion of the potential revenue pie from
allowances is scheduled to be given away to businesses and
to other emitters of greenhouse gases. In our view, that is a
poor policy choice. Giving away allowances unnecessarily
exacerbates the harmful impact of cap and trade on lower-
income Californians and does so without substantially ad-
vancing any other important policy goals. ✰
12See, e.g., Gamage, ‘‘Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the
Fiscal Volatility Problem,’’ 98 Cal. Law Rev. 749 (2010); Gamage,
‘‘Coping Through California’s Budget Crises in Light of Proposition
13 and California’s Fiscal Constitution,’’ in After the Tax Revolt:
California’s Proposition 13 Turns 30, Jack Citrin and Isaac Martin, eds.
(2009).
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